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1    Introduction 
 
1.1   Chemical process safety: HAZOP is not enough 
 
Industrial chemical processes (refineries, petrochemical, pharmaceutics…) usually work 
with great amounts of potentially dangerous materials (toxics, explosives, flammables…), 
very often under extreme conditions (high temperature and/or pressure). That can lead to 
accidents with the associated human and economic losses. Although safety systems have 
evolved during the last decades, the reality is that accidents still happen with losses over 
1000 million dollar only in USA refineries. The Abnormal Situation Management 
consortium has shown that losses can be as high as 3–8% of the total plant production 
(Nimmo, 1995). 
The history of process safety is short in comparison with process industry history. 
Safety regulations have been developed in the last 30 years, usually driven by important 
accidents (Flixborough in 1974, Seveso in 1976, Three Mile Island in 1979, Bhopal in 
1984)  causing widespread  public concerns about major incidents in  chemical  plants 
(Mannan, 2004). 
After World War II, the concept of reliability was very closely related to safety. 
During the last century, some hazard analysis techniques were developed to identify 
hazards (chemical, physical or changing conditions that have the potential for causing 
damage; Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1999). Those include checklists, what-if 
analysis, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). 
The most widely applied is HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability study), developed by ICI 
in 1960s. A HAZOP study is a highly disciplined procedure meant to identify how a 
process may deviate from its design intent. It is defined as the application of a formal, 
systematic critical examination of the process and the engineering intentions of new or 
existing facilities to assess the potential for malfunctioning of individual pieces of 
equipment, and the consequential effects on the facility (Dunjó et al., 2010). It divides 
the whole system in nodes following Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs). A 
multidisciplinary  team  makes  the  analysis  by  applying  some  guidewords  to  state 
variables so deviations from design intention are produced and consequence analysis is 
carried out. One of its main advantages is that it is very intuitive and simple in the 
application. Besides, the study is systematic and comprehensive, making it very popular 
for the process industry. So much that an IEC standard (61882:2001) has been developed 
to homogenise the way of HAZOP application. However, there are some disadvantages 
in the use of HAZOP as a hazard analysis technique: 
 
• No means to assess hazards involving interactions between different parts of the 
system. 
 
•    No ranking or priorisation of hazards and solutions. 
 
•    Time consuming and expensive. 
 
• Both human and organisational factors are rarely taken into consideration and only 
related to lower levels in the organisational hierarchy. 
 
In addition, from the beginning of using process hazard analysis techniques in the 
chemical industry, much have been learnt from the accidents occurred that can be 
summarised as follows (Pasman, 1998): 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
           
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 The conditions that lead to an accident are often complex and difficult to reproduce.  
 Test methods are often inadequate for making reliable predictions.  
 A system approach appears crucial for successful prevention. 
The concurrence of multiple factors in systemic failures is the biggest challenge to cope 
during the present century. In this way, Hollnagel, Wood and Leveson (2006) proposed 
resilience as the way to deal with complexity. Resilience is seen as the ability to recover 
a process from situations that potentially lead to mishap. Since then, Prof. Nancy 
Leveson from MIT started working on the systemic approach, resulting in the so-called 
System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) as detailed in literature 
(Leveson, 2011). 
The shortcomings of the classical accident causation models used in the chemical 
industry, and why new techniques such as STAMP/STPA are needed, have been deeply 
discussed by Leveson and Stephanopoulos (2014). They stated that the prevailing 
assumption of classical models is that accidents are caused by chains of directly related 
events, what oversimplifies causality. It implies a limitation of the models in that they are 
unable to go beyond designers’ knowledge (it is impossible to find causes that are not 
considered). Other advantage of STAMP/STPA over classical models is that the latter do 
not consider many of the systemic factors involved in accidents and the interaction 
between events as well as the description of the influence of the management-regulation-
legislation layer on the process. 
1.2 STAMP-STPA foundations 
Failures are very rarely caused only by single component or personnel flaws. 
Traditionally, company management teams tended to consider one person or equipment 
as the root of accidents, i.e., Union Carbide initially blamed an employee causing Bhopal 
accident, ignoring other (company) responsibilities such as maintenance, procedures or 
regulatory agencies. Since 2000, many researchers and company safety teams are 
claiming a systems engineering point of view of risk management (Rasmussen and 
Svedung, 2000; Venkatasubramanian, 2011). One of the strongest efforts in order to 
develop a systemic safety theory has been made by Leveson (2011). She states that safety 
is an emergent property of the system that is enforced by safety constraints. This is the 
key assumption of STAMP. Therefore, the goal of STAMP is to control the behaviour of 
the components and system to ensure that safety constraints are enforced. At each level 
of the system structure, control loops (Figure 1) exist. In the STAMP model of accident 
causation, safety is an emergent property that arises when system components interact 
with each other within a larger environment. 
The main advantage of Leveson approach is that its general control loop structure  
can be applied to all the levels of the socio-technical organisation levels as depicted in 
Figure 2. 
From STAMP general theory, two different techniques have been developed trying to 
improve, on one hand, existing hazard analysis techniques and, on the other hand, 
existing accident analysis techniques. These two approaches are STPA (System Theoretic 
Process Analysis) and CAST (Causal Analysis based on STamp). In this paper we are 
focused on hazard analysis, so, only the STPA analysis will be taken into account. 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
                  
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Figure 1 General control loop 
 
Figure 2 Example of socio-technical control structure (adapted from Leveson, 2011) 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
           
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
STPA is a hazard analysis method based on STAMP. STPA is a new hazard analysis 
technique with the same goals as any other hazard analysis technique, that is, to identify 
scenarios leading to hazards and thus to losses so they can be eliminated or controlled. 
However, STPA is based on systems theory while traditional hazard analysis techniques 
have reliability theory at their foundation.  
The STPA applying procedure has four steps that are necessary to complete the 
process. The steps are (detailed in Leveson, 2011 and Leveson and Thomas, 2013) as 
follows: 
1 Identify hazards and accidents.  
2 Draw the control structure.  
3 Identify potentially unsafe control actions.  
4 Use the identified unsafe control actions to create safety requirements and 
constraints.  
An unsafe control action (UCA) is the one that leads to a hazard. Leveson defines 
hazards as “A system state or set of conditions that together with a particular set of 
worst-case environmental conditions, will lead to an accident (loss)” (Leveson, 2011). In 
STPA there are four types of UCAs. On one hand, hazards can occur when a control 
action is ‘provided’ or ‘not provided’ and, on the other, when a control action has been 
carried out ‘too late or too early’ or it is provided ‘too long or stopped too soon’. Thus, 
the first two types of UCAs are related to the control action status and the second two 
with the control action timing. Figure 1 allows for a systematic analysis of what factors 
can go wrong. The generic loop (applied identified control structure in step 2) is used 
mainly in step 3 and part in step 4. 
2 Application of STPA to the chemical industry 
2.1 A new approach 
STAMP has been applied to different industries (nuclear, aviation, etc.), and it has been 
proposed as a promising methodology for the process industry (De Rademaeker et al., 
2014) although there are no published works on how it should be applied in this industry. 
In this paper a new approach is suggested to apply STPA to the chemical and oil & gas 
industries. The application is focused on the lowest level of the control architecture, that 
is related to the equipment and process control loops. Upper control levels (human 
operators, alarms, maintenance, supervising, etc.) are not addressed and are the subject of 
a future paper. The main change to be done in the application of STPA to the process 
industry lies in step 3. The four unsafe control action types described in the previous 
section are enough for different domains but for chemical systems two extra unsafe 
control actions types are needed and have to be taken into account to enforce system 
safety. 
Process plants are, usually, continuous plants and the control is achieved using 
conventional PID controllers that send the control action to the final element, typically a 
control valve. The operation of the valve is also continuous, and as it is not an On/Off 
controller (the valve is not just open/closed) the Provided/Not Provided UCAs are not 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
                  
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
sufficient to describe the control action status. They have to be extended to include if the 
control action is more or less than it should be. So the UCAs for this system are 
‘provided’ (we considered that provided means provided correctly, in the exact amount), 
More and Less (both of them constitute the Not Provided type). More or Less are directly 
related to the final value (after the control action) of the manipulated variable. In most of 
the cases the Less type effect includes the None effect on the process although there are 
some specific situations where None has to be specified besides the Less type. This could 
be considered as a third type of the Not Provided control action. For example if pressure 
is controlled in a vessel (hazard: high pressure) manipulating the exit stream a More 
control action is safe but a Less control action is unsafe as it means that gas is 
accumulating in the vessel. The reason to distinguish between more and less instead of 
leaving Not provided is because in some cases More can lead to a hazard and Less can 
lead to a different one in the same equipment. 
Nowadays, STPA tables are individually generated for each UCA studying hazards 
for different scenarios (a scenario is a UCA along with context, not controlled, variables) 
(Leveson and Thomas, 2013). In the approach proposed herein, all UCAs are studied at 
the same time in the same table. Scenarios (context variables) are also discretised in 
‘Desired’, ‘None’, ‘Less’ and ‘More’ (following the same UCA discretisation criteria). 
For real systems, the size of STPA tables will be huge (although less than using different 
tables for every UCA). The STPA Table Size (STS) can be calculated by equation (1):  




Number of UCAs Number of states
=
considered for considered fori j
STS
i j
            (1) 
As it can be seen, the number of rows to evaluate in STPA tables can be huge. Therefore, 
some solutions are under development in order to automate the analysis process. One of 
them is the A-STPA open tool created by Asim Abdulkhaleq at the Institute of Software 
Technology, Stuttgart (Abdulkhaleq and Wagner, 2014).  
Table 1 System engineering foundations of the process 
Accident  Hazard Safety Constraint 
Explosion  H1: Temp too high Temp must never violate maximum value 
2.2 Example 1: a polymerisation reactor 
The first process studied is a single reactor with only one control loop. The process is a 
batch polymerisation reaction. The reactor has two different feeds, one corresponds to the 
monomer (Fmon) and the other one corresponds to the initiator (Fini) needed for the 
polymerisation reaction to occur. The reactor is cooled with an internal coil in which 
cooling water is circulated to control temperature (exothermic reaction). There is a single 
control loop to keep the reactor temperature manipulating the cooling water supply as 
shown in Figure 3 (Rodriguez and Diaz, 2014).  
The size of the STPA table for this case is 4 4 4 = 64   (one controlled variable, 
TCV1, and two context variables, Fini and Fmon) rows (Table 2) that can be drastically 
reduced by removing all combinations intrinsically safe (Table 3). For example, in those 
cases where ’More’ cooling water was supplied the system would be overcooled. It  
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
           
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
would also happen when the cooling water would be supplied as required (‘Provided’). If 
the refrigeration required is provided the system is always safe. Other examples of 
systems intrinsically safe are those where either the monomer or the initiator is not fed to 
the reactor. If one of the reactants needed is not present the reaction cannot be carried 
out, so temperature cannot rise. Besides, for this system, there are not differences 
between ‘Less’ and ‘No’ cooling water flow in terms of safety, so this cases would be 
studied together as ‘Less’. 
Figure 3 Process flow diagram of the polymerisation reactor 
 
Table 2 STPA hazard analysis table of the polymerisation reactor 
ID Fini Fmon TCV1 Hazard? 
1 + + + No 
2 + + – Yes 
3 + + No Yes 
4 + + Provided No 
5 + – + No 
6 + – – Yes 
7 + – No Yes 
8 + – Provided No 
9 + No + No 
10 + No – No 
11 + No No No 
12 + No Provided No 
13 + Desired + No 
14 + Desired – Yes 
15 + Desired No Yes 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
                  
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Table 2 STPA hazard analysis table of the polymerisation reactor (continued) 
ID Fini Fmon TCV1 Hazard? 
16 + Desired Provided No 
17 – + + No 
18 – + – Yes 
19 – + No Yes 
20 – + Provided No 
21 – – + No 
22 – – – Yes 
23 – – No Yes 
24 – – Provided No 
25 – No + No 
26 – No – No 
27 – No No No 
28 – No Provided No 
29 – Desired + No 
30 – Desired – Yes 
31 – Desired No Yes 
32 – Desired Provided No 
33 No + + No 
34 No + – No 
35 No + No No 
36 No + Provided No 
37 No – + No 
38 No – – No 
39 No – No No 
40 No – Provided No 
41 No No + No 
42 No No – No 
43 No No No No 
44 No No Provided No 
45 No Desired + No 
46 No Desired – No 
47 No Desired Not Provided No 
48 No Desired Provided No 
49 Desired + + No 
50 Desired + – Yes 
51 Desired + No Yes 
52 Desired + Provided No 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
           
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Table 2 STPA hazard analysis table of the polymerisation reactor (continued) 
ID Fini Fmon TCV1 Hazard? 
53 Desired – + No 
54 Desired – – Yes 
55 Desired – No Yes 
56 Desired – Provided No 
57 Desired No + No 
58 Desired No – No 
59 Desired No No No 
60 Desired No Provided No 
61 Desired Desired + No 
62 Desired Desired – Yes 
63 Desired Desired No Yes 
64 Desired Desired Provided No 
Table 3 Reduced STPA hazard analysis table 
ID Fini Fmon TCV1 Hazard? 
1 + + – Yes 
2 + – – Yes 
3 + Desired – Yes 
4 – + – Yes 
5 – – – Yes 
6 – No – No 
7 – Desired – Yes 
8 Desired + – Yes 
9 Desired – – Yes 
10 Desired Desired – Yes 
11 No All All No 
12 All No All No 
12 All All + No 
12 All All Provided No 
To illustrate the differences with respect to HAZOP studies, only the cooling water 
supply (CWS) line is commented here. From HAZOP, if NO guide word is applied to 
variable FLOW in CWS line, HAZOP results in a hazard of a possible temperature rise. 
The next step in HAZOP analysis would result in some recommendations to be 
implemented in the safety instrumented system (SIS). That, in principle, should agree 
with some of STPA proposed solutions. From STPA analysis, as shown in Tables 2 and 
3, not all the cases are necessarily hazardous. For example, there are different scenarios 
in which ‘Less/No’ flow are safe scenarios. So, in other words, STPA analysis results not 
only in the detection of hazardous situations but also in the potential solutions that can be 
implemented in SIS. So the solution (to force a safe scenario) when cooling water valve 
is not open would be to close reactive flows. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
                  
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Figure 4 Process flow diagram of the process 
 
Table 4 System engineering foundations of the process 
Accident Hazard Safety Constraint 
Explosion 
H1: Temp. too high Temp. must never violate maximum value 
H2: Pressure too high Pressure must never violate maximum value 
Leakage H3: Level too high Level must never violate maximum value 
2.3 Example 2: a generic exothermic reactor 
The system studied is an exothermic reactor where a vapour stream (Feed 1) and a liquid 
stream (Feed 2) are fed to the reactor. The products of the reaction are also in vapour and 
liquid phase so two outlet streams are present. The system is pressurised (about 30 bar) to 
improve gas solubility into the liquid. This can be achieved by controlling pressure, 
manipulating the flow rate of the top gas product stream. On the other hand, liquid level 
in the reactor is also controlled by means of bottom liquid product flow rate. The reaction 
is carried out at constant temperature (around 200°C) so an internal heat exchanger (coil) 
is required. Temperature is kept by changing cooling water flow rate. 
First of all it can be remarked the big size of STPA (Table 5) as the complexity of the 
system increases. In this case, for five controllers, it is necessary to carry out 243 
individual analyses. And it is just for one unit, so one of the main limitations expected for 
STPA analysis is the great number of rows for the tables, although the table can be 
reduced following the same approach described earlier. Therefore, great efforts are being 
done to automatise table generation and analysis. Our approach under development is 
through functional modelling (Rodriguez and Diaz, 2014).  
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
           
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Table 5 STPA hazard analysis table of the polymerisation reactor 
ID FCV1 FCV2 PCV1 TCV1 LCV1 Hazard 
1 + + + + + No 
2 + + + + – H3 
4 + + + + Provided No 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
85 + – + – + No, only if ‘–’ in FCV2 means no  flow. If less flow H1 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
103 – – + – + No only if ‘–’ in either FCV2 or  FCV1 means no flow 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
181 – – + + + No 
182 – – + + – H3 
183 – – + + – No 
184 – – + + Provided No 
185 – – + – + No, only if ‘–’ in either FCV2 or  FCV1 means no flow. If less flow H1 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
When all STPA analysis is available, much extra information is obtained compared to 
HAZOP. As an example, again for the cooling system it can be seen that the system is 
not always unsafe when no cooling water is supplied (ID 85), and also we have identified 
a great set of safe scenarios. That means that we can also ’measure’ how far our situation 
is from any of all safe scenarios and take minimum actions in order to force the system to 
the closest safe scenario. 
2.4 HAZOP comparison 
In order to provide a comparison with traditional HAZOP studies, let’s consider the 
following example of a HAZOP application: the oil vaporiser. This is documented in 
international standards (BSI Standards, 2001) and shown in Figure 5. In this example, the 
hazards taken into account are H1: high temperature and H2: high pressure in the 
vaporiser (Table 6). 
If three UCAs (Provided, LESS, MORE) are applied to each control action, it would 
result in 43 = 81  rows in STPA table. However, some cases are not applicable and can be 
avoided in order to reduce STPA table size. For example, for the interlock actions only 
‘Provided’ and ‘Not Provided’ (LESS) will be taken into account according to interlock 
logic implementation. The number of cases to be studied is 3 3 3 2 = 54   . Besides, all 
cases in which interlock control action is not provided are themselves unsafe. For all 
those cases, H1 is present. Therefore, they are eliminated from the STPA so the number 




   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
                  
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Figure 5 Process flow diagram of the oil vaporiser 
 
Table 6 System engineering foundations of the process 
Accident Hazard Safety Constraint 
Explosion 
H1: Temp. too high Temp. must never violate maximum value 
H2: Pressure too high Pressure must never violate maximum value 
From HAZOP (BSI Standards, 2001) the installation of a low flow alarm in the liquid oil 
stream as one of the main suggested recommendations. As it can be seen in Table 7, it 
can also be deduced from STPA analysis (rows 19 to 27) that a lower liquid flow rate is 
related with H1 (increased temperature). Once again, the closest safety state is given. For 
example, it is proposed that one solution for situation 19 would be 21 with no flow 
through PRV. This means closing the PRV or, easier, closing the valve associated to TC1  
(ID 25). 
Nevertheless, although for the situations studied, STPA is a superset of HAZOP 
resulting in a deeper study of the system with extra information given, HAZOP provides 
other information related to other key words applied but not taken into account  
in this work. For example, when applying ‘Other than’ to the liquid oil stream, an 
evaluation of the influence on vaporiser behaviour of other types of material different 
from oil (i.e. water) is studied. A way to introduce this kind of situation in a STPA study 
could be by defining a new hazard associated with the new situation (‘water is present’), 
add the control structure associated (if exists) and then analyse new UCAs together with 
the existing ones.  
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
           
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Table 7 STPA hazard analysis table of the oil vaporiser 
ID FC1 TC1 PRV Hazard 
1 Provided Provided Provided No 
2 Provided Provided + H2 
3 Provided Provided – No 
4 Provided + Provided H1 
5 Provided + + H1, H2 
6 Provided + – H1. No hazard if ‘–’ in  PRV means no flow 
7 Provided – Provided No 
8 Provided – + No 
9 Provided – – No 
10 + Provided Provided No 
11 + Provided + No 
12 + Provided – No 
13 + + Provided H1 
14 + + + H1, H2 
15 + + – No 
16 + – Provided No 
17 + – + No 
18 + – – No 
19 – Provided Provided No 
20 – Provided + H2 
21 – Provided – H1. No hazard if ‘–’ in  PRV means no flow 
22 – + Provided H1 
23 – + + H1, H2 
24 – + – H1. No hazard if ‘–’ in  PRV means no flow 
25 – – Provided H1. No hazard if ‘–’ in  TC1 means no flow 
26 – – + H1, H2. No hazard if ‘–’ in  TC1 means no flow 
27 – – – H1. No hazard if ‘–’ in  either PRV or TC1 means no flow 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
                  
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
3 Conclusions 
This paper has applied the STPA methodology to the lowest level of chemical process 
control architecture. Through several examples it has been shown that STPA can 
potentially replace, or at least complement, HAZOP as the hazard analysis technique for 
chemical and oil& gas industries. Although the differences between the two techniques 
are not so important in the lowest level, the great advantage of STPA lies in its systemic 
nature (i.e. it can assess hazards involving interactions between system parts). Another 
advantage of STPA is that, in the examples studied, it can be seen that it can give the 
solution too (closest safe scenario). Besides it is better to apply STPA than HAZOP 
because the low level analysis could be coupled with the high level analysis (human and 
organisational factors). This will be the topic of a future paper of our group. 
A problem found when the approach proposed is applied, is the great size of the 
resulting tables. It is needed to develop a tool in order to simplify the analysis. It can be 
done by applying functional modelling as a way to automate the analysis of some  
(or all) cases. Since 2009 (Rodriguez and Sanz, 2009), we are working on the 
development and application of the functional modelling technique called D-higraphs. 
Specifically, we are working now on the way D-higraphs can improve the applicability of 
STPA to chemical processes. 
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